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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MORTGAGE M ORATORIU-Minnesota statute au-
thorized the courts to grant a two-year extension of time in which redemp-
tion might be made from mortgage foreclosure sales, but required as a
condition precedent to the procurement of this period of grace, that the
mortgagor be ordered to pay the income or the reasonable rental value of
the property toward the discharge of debts arising out of taxes, interest
on the mortgage loan, and insurance. Such act was to remain in effect
only during continuance of the emergency and in no event beyond May 1,
1935. The state supreme court sustained this legislation as a valid exer-
cise of the police power because of the publid economic emergency, rather
than an impairment of the obligation of contract. Held: on. appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, judgment affirmed, four judges dissenting.l
As this decision is the first by the United States Supreme Court con-
cerning the recent emergency relief legislation, it has invoked much criti-
cism, both pro and con, as to its soundness. The issue of real significance
is in fact, one of approach; that is, whether the Constitution of the United
States is to be interpreted as of the time of its framers, or is to be in-
terpreted in the light of present day conditions and social demands. This
issue is clearly pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes speaking for the court'
and Justice Sutherland speaking for the dissenting judges. In the Chief
Justice's opinion appears the following passage, "If by the statement that
what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means today, it
is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be con-
fined to the interpretation which the framers with the conditions and out-
look of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its
own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that
Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning: 'We must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding' (McCullouch v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat 316, 417, 4 L. Ed. 579).; 'a constitution intended to endure
for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs'." 2 While if we turn to the dissenting opinion, the follow-
ing statement is found, "A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly neces-
sary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It
does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at
another time. If the contract impairment clause, when framed and
adopted, meant that the terms of a contract for the payment of money
could not be altered in invitum by a state statute enacted for the relief of
hardly pressed debtors to the end and with the effect of postponing pay-
ment or enforcement during and because of an economic or financial emer-
gency, it is but to state the obvious to say that it means the same now."3
To determine philosophically which of the two views is the right one
would be to invoke an endless debate which has had sufficient precedent
ever since the adoption of that document. Thus, it is better to look to the
historical development of the contract impairment clause, propounded by
the highest court in the land, to ascertain the correctness of this decision.
Bank (1869), 1 S. C. 441; Henney Buggy Co. v. Higham (1897), 7 N. D. 45, 72
N. W. 911; Alton v. Taxicab Co. (1910), 66 Msc. 191, 121 N. Y. S. 271.
IBlaisdell v. Home Building and Loan Assn. (1934), 54 S. Ct. 231.
2Blaisdell v. Home Building and Loan Assn. (1934), 54 S. Ct. 231, 242.
3 Blaisdell v. Home Building and Loan Assn. (1934), 54 S. Ct. 231, 244.
RECENT CASE NOTES
After the court in the celebrated Dartmouth College Case4 held that a con-
tract obligation was impaired by a subsequent law of the state, this clause
of the Constitution 5 has gained prominence. And for the next fifty years,
the court held that a contract obligation was impaired though the state
passed its law in the exercise of the police power, or taxation, or eminent
domain. 6 It was during this interim, that the court, on numerous occa-
sions, held that state legislation extending the period of redemption of
existing mortgages was an impairment of the obligation of contract and
therefore void. 7 If we were to stop here and rely upon these cases as
judicial precedent, our conclusion as to the correctness of this case would
not be persuasive due to the uncomprehensive treatment of the subject.
For in none of these cases was the question of the exercise by the state of
its police power raised or discussed.
Finally, the court, by a number of cases, came to the position that all
contracts are subject to the proper exercise of the police power by the
state, as to public morals,8 public health,9 public safety,iO and, lastly, as to
economic social interests."1 The exercise of the police power is not an
impairment of the obligation of contract, but a limitation upon the guar-
antee against impairment set down in the contract clause of the Consti-
tution. The police power is a power reserved to the state and one to which
all contracts are made subject.12 Chief Justice Hughes recognizes such a
limitation, for, in the opinion of the instant case, he writes, "The economic
interests of the state may justify the exercise of its continuing and domi-
nating protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts."13
Thus, in the light of judicial precedent, it is obvious that the construction
placed upon the contract impairment clause by Chief Justice Hughes is
correct, and that Justice Sutherland's contention is without foundation.
Having determined that contracts are made subject to the proper exer-
cise of the police power by the state, the question now arises whether this
legislation was a proper exercise of that power? The declaration by the
legislature concerning public conditions is given great respect by the court
(1819), 4 Wheat 518.
sArt. I, Sec. 10-"No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts."
6Bridge Pro. v. Hoboken Co. (1864), 1 Wall. 116; Piqua Bank v. Knoop
(1853), 16 How. 369; see H. E. Willis, Some Conflicting Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court (1927), 13 Va. L. Rev. 155.
71Bonson v. Klnzie (1843), 1 How. 311; Howard v. Bugbee (1860), 24 How.
461; Edwards v. Kearzey (1877), 96 U. S. 595.
Stone v. Mississippi (1879), 101 U. S. 746.
OButchers, etc. Co. v. Crecent City Co. (1883), 111 U. S. 746; Block v. Hirsh
(1921), 256 U. S. 135; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1921), 256 U. S.
170.
"0Texas, etc. Co. v. Miller (1911), 221 U. S. 408; New Orleans v. Louisiana
Light Co. (1885), 115 U. S. 650; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Goldsboro (1913),
232 U. S. 548.
"Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Illinois (1892), 146 U. S. 387; Manigault v.
Springs (1905), 199 U. S. 473; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (1908),
209 U. S. 349; see H. E. Willis, Some Conflicting Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court (1927), 13 Va. L. Rev. 155.
"Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Goldsboro (1913), 232 U. S. 548; 44 S. Ct.
405; People v. La Fetra (1921), 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601; Gultag v. Shatzkin
(1921), 230 N. Y. 647, 130 N. B. 929.
'JBlaisdell v. Home Building and Loan Assn. (1934), 54 S. Ct. 231, 239.
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insomuch as the court recognizes that it is the duty of the legislature to
know of such conditions.14 However, such declaration by the legislature
is always subject to judicial review.15 In the present case, the legislature
declared that a public economic emergency existed in Minnesota and that
it was deemed imperative to pass this legislation for the public good.16
And the United States Supreme Court, after noting that the legislation
was temporary in character and that it was limited to the exigency which
called it forth, upheld the act as a proper exercise of the police power by
that state, due to the economic emergency existing in that state.
The Court is very careful to point out that the emergency does not
give the state the power to pass such a law but only creates the occasion
for the exercise of its inherent police power; Chief Justice Hughes say-
ing, "While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of that power. 'Altho an emergency may not
call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may
afford a reason for the exercise of a living power already enjoyed.' Wil-
son v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 348, 37 S. Ct. 298, 302."17
Judicial determination of what is a proper exercise of the police "power
by a state involves a balancing of social interests. For here, on the one
hand, is the social interest in the security of contract obligations; while
on the other, is the social interest in our economic social structure. Thus
the court will declare legislation constitutional or unconstitutional, depend-
ing on which of the two social interests, in its estimation, weighs the
heavier. Such determination is largely a matter of judicial discretion,
and so in many cases, altho you or I might personally disagree with the
result, yet we cannot adversely criticize the decision, it being a matter
which reasonable men might rightfully reach opposite results. Never-
theless, there may be other cases, in which the court has abused its sound
discretion and reached a result which is preposterous in the light of the
circumstances; then, I think, it is possible to call the decision erroneous.
It seems that the particular case under discussion falls within the first
group, and that it would not be fitting for the writer to criticize adversely
the discretion of the court where it has been so carefully invoked.
S. E. M.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS-CAN SECURITIES OF THE NEW CORPORA-
TION BE FORCED ON RECALCITRANT CRFmITORS?-The reorganization plan
submitted in the recent Coriell case provided that all the assets of the
14Block v. Hlrsh (1921), 256 U. S. 135, 154; People v. La Fetra (1921), 230
N. Y. 429, 440, 130 N. E. 601.
-Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair (1924), 264 U. S. 543, 44 S. Ct. 405, reversing
(1923), 290 Fed. 348; Johnson v. Jones (1925), 48 S. D. 260, 204 S. W. 15.
15Preamble of the act after setting forth the conditions in Minnesota at that
time, reads, "Whereas, it is believed, and the Legislature of Minnesota hereby
declares its belief, that the conditions existing as hereinbefore set forth has created
an emergency of such nature that justifies and validates legislation for the exten-
sion of the time of redemption from mortgage foreclosure and execution sales and
other relief of a like character; and Whereas, The State of Minnesota possesses
the right under its police power to declare a state of emergency to exist, and
Whereas, the Inherent and fundamental purposes of our government Is to safe-
guard the public and promote the general welfare of the people, etc."
27Blasdell v. Home Building and Loan Assn. (1934), 54 S. CL 231, 235.
